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WHY THE CAPTA'S BABY DOE RULES SHOULD
BE REJECTED IN FAVOR OF THE BEST
INTERESTS STANDARD
Loretta M. Kopelman*
INTRODUCTION
The current Baby Doe Rules are formally the Child Abuse
Amendments of 19841 to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA).2 The CAPTA Amendments, which concern the
treatment of infants less than one year of age,3 went into effect on
May 15, 1985 and set federal funding requirements for states to
receive grants.4 CAPTA's Baby Doe Rules require all infants to
receive maximal treatment, including all medications, feeding and
hydration, unless in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable
medical judgment one of the following exceptions is met:
(i) The infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(ii) The provision of such treatment would merely prolong
dying, not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of
the infant's life-threatening conditions, or otherwise be
futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or
* Professor Emeritus and founding Chair, Department of Medical Humanities, Brody School of
Medicine, East Carolina University, and Faculty Affiliate, Georgetown University.
1. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106ii (2006) and implemented in relevant part by 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2008)). These
amendments are informally known as the CAPTA or Baby Doe Rules or Amendments. "Baby Doe"
refers to the child in Indiana whose death precipitated the law.
2. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107, 5118 (2006),
and implemented in part at 45 C.F.R. 1340.15(b)(2) (2006).
3. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(3)(i) (defining "infant").
4. 42 U.S.C. § 5106ia(b)(2)(B) (2006).
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(iii) The provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself
under such circumstances would be inhumane.'
The Rules were named after an infant known as "Baby Doe" who
was born in 1982.6 The baby had Trisomy 21 (Down's syndrome)
and an esophageal atresia. On the advice of their obstetrician, the
infant's parents refused to give permission for the life-saving surgery
to remove the baby's intestinal blockage; the baby's pediatrician and
hospital administrators sought a court order, but the Indiana courts
sided with the parents; the baby died as an appeal was being made to
the United States Supreme Court.7
Ronald Reagan, who was President at the time, intended the Rules
to restrict medical decisions that doctors, parents and guardians could
make for imperiled infants: "the real issue is whether to affirm and
protect the sanctity of all human life, or to embrace a social ethic
where some human lives are valued and others are not. As a nation,
we must choose between the sanctity of life ethic and the 'quality of
life' ethic." 8 Reagan rejected the quality of life ethic and sought to
forbid the withholding or withdrawing of medications, hydration, or
nutrition unless in the reasonable medical judgment of physicians the
infant was irreversibly comatose or interventions would only prolong
dying.
5. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (2008) ("The term 'withholding of medically indicated treatment'
means the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including
appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in the treating physician's or physicians'
reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such
conditions, except that the term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate
nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating physician's or physicians'
reasonable medical judgment---(i) The infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose: (ii) The provision
of such treatment would merely prolong dying, not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the
infant's life-threatening conditions, or otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or (iii)
The provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the
treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane).
6. See ALBERT JONSEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 112-13 (Oxford Univ. Press
2000).
7. JONSEN, supra note 6, at 112.
8. Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE
LAW 355 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 3d ed. 1986).
[VoL 25:4
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Reagan's Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, also strongly
supported these regulations, agreeing with Reagan that they are in
infants' best interests:
[M]edicine, nutrition and fluids are life itself [and regardless of
age, individuals should be protected; they should] . . . receive
whatever treatment is indicated. That does not mean prolonging
the act of dying. But it does at least mean providing her with the
nutrition and fluids needed to sustain life at its most basic level.9
I. CRITICISMS OF THE BABY DOE RULES
Criticisms of CAPTA's Baby Doe Rules soon came from many
sides. In a survey conducted shortly after the Rules were enacted,
neonatologists and other pediatricians reported that they sometimes
interfered with the doctors' duties to act in the best interests of their
patients. !0 Up to one-third of respondents when evaluating a
hypothetical case stated that the Rules would force them to act
counter to their judgment of what was in the infant's best interest.'1
These respondents also reported that these amendments were
unnecessary to defend the rights of imperiled infants, ignored
parental rights, and failed to offer adequate consideration of the
infant's suffering. 12
The criticisms had similarities to those of the United States
Supreme Court in Bowen v. American Hospital Association13 in its
consideration of an earlier set of similar Baby Doe Rules
14
9. C. Everett Koop, The Challenge of Definition, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2, 3 (1989).
10. Loretta M. Kopelman, Thomas G. Irons & Arthur E. Kopelman, Neonatologists Judge the "'Baby
Doe" Regulations, 318, 11 NEW ENG. J. MED. 677, 677-83 (1988); Loretta M. Kopelman, Arthur E.
Kopelman & Thomas G. Irons Neonatologists, Pediatrics and the Supreme Court Criticize the "Baby
Doe " Regulations, in COMPELLED COMPASSION 237-66 (Arthur L. Caplan, Robert H. Blank & Janna C.
Merrick eds., 1992).
11. Loretta M. Kopelman, Arthur E. Kopelman & Thomas G. Irons, Neonatologists, Pediatrics
and the Supreme Court Criticize the "Baby Doe" Regulations, supra note 10.
12. Id. at 254; accord infra Table 1.
13. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610,630-48 (1986).
14. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care for Handicapped
Infants-HHS Final Rules, 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622-54 (Jan. 12, 1984).
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promulgated as regulations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.15 The Supreme Court held that these rules could not be
issued using this section of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.16 The
Court rejected the Reagan administration's argument that the failure
to provide maximal treatments, unless one of the three exceptions
existed, was discriminatory and violated infants' civil rights. 17 The
Court criticized the rules for ignoring parents' traditional role to
decide what was in their infant's best interest.18 The Court further
stated that concerned parents might select among different treatment
plans recommended by the infant's physicians; the rules took an
oversimplified view of medical decision-making in supposing it was
discriminatory and prejudicial to evaluate an infant's disability in
choosing a treatment. In fact, the Court explained, the degree of a
person's disability was relevant to making good medical treatment
decisions, including those regarding life-sustaining interventions.
These rules thus represented an unjustifiable effort to influence
medical standards of care even though no evidence of discrimination
was shown. 19  The Court was also critical of the Reagan
administration for exerting undue pressure on state agencies to
comply.
20
While certain right-to-life and religious groups supportedthe Baby
Doe Rules, 2 1 some theologians were critical of enacting such a highly
restrictive view of what was best for sick infants. William May, a
well-known Protestant theologian, argued that taking death as the
15. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). The first set of Baby
Doe Regulations were issued in 1984 and based upon Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973:
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual... shall, solely by reason of this handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." The first set of Baby Doe Rules were regulated
federally and not optional. The Supreme Court struck them down in 1986 in Bowen. In contrast,
CAPTA's Baby Doe Rules are requirements for states to receive federal money and are technically
optional. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, supra note 14.
16. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 642-47.
17. Id. at 636.
18. Id. at 627, n.13.
19. Id. at 643.
20. Id. at 639-42.
21. Thomas H. Murray, The Final, Anticlimactic Rule on Baby Doe, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5,
7-8 (1985). See Reagan, supra note 8, at 352-58.
[Vol. 25:4
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highest evil is not a sanctity of life position, but an idolatry of the
physical.22 Sanctity of life should be understood as a duty to prevent
untimely death and not as a justification for preserving life at all
costs. 23 H. Danner Clouser argued that sanctity of life should be
24understood as the duty to preserve life unless a higher duty exists.
Richard McCormick, a well-known Jesuit theologian, maintained that
when people lack the potential for interpersonal relationships there is
25no obligation to require life-saving treatments.
Some members of the leadership of the American Academy of
Pediatrics (AAP) argued that these criticisms were misguided and it
was mistaken to suppose that the Rules disrupt standards of care,
inhibit reasonable medical judgment, or interfere with acting in
infants' best interest.26 Robert Haggerty, M.D., who was President of
the AAP when they were passed, saw them as no threat and
reportedly said, "[i]t would appear that the final rule reaffirms the
role of reasonable medical judgment and that decisions should be
made in the best interests of the infant.",27 A decade later, members of
the AAP's 1996 Committee on Bioethics agreed, contending that the
Rules allow considerable discretion because they include the words
"reasonable medical judgment" and "appropriate" and allow non-
treatment where it is "inhumane."
28
These AAP interpretations, however, are not supported by the text,
which requires maximal life saving interventions, including
appropriate nutrition, hydration and medication unless the infant is
dying or comatose. Discontinuing maximal life-saving interventions
(other than appropriate nutrition, hydration and medication) may be
22. WILLIAM F. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER IN MEDICAL ETHICS,
68-69 (Westminster Press 1983).
23. Id.
24. K. Danner Clouser, "The Sanctity of Life ": An Analysis of a Concept, 78 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MED. 119, 119,123 (1973).
25. Richard McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229, 2 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 172,175-76 (1974).
26. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics (AAP), Committee on Bioethics, Ethics in the Care of Critically 1ll
Infants and Children, 98 PEDIATRICS 149, 149-52 (1996).
27. See Murray, supra note 21, at 6.
28. See AAP, supra note 26; see also 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (2008).
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permitted when, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable
medical judgment, one of the three conditions has been fulfilled. The
first exception is that the infant is in an irreversible coma. This one
and only quality of life consideration that is permitted is very
restrictive. The second exception contains three clauses each of
which states an exception; it permits the discontinuing of maximal
life saving interventions when treatment would "merely prolong
dying, not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's
life-threatening conditions, or otherwise be futile in terms of the
survival of the infant., 29 The first and third clauses express
exceptions clarifying that the infant must be dying or that the
interventions would be futile in promoting the infant's survive. It
would be an error to suppose, as the 1996 Committee on Bioethics
did, that the second clause of the second exception allows doctors and
families the discretion to discontinue maximal life-saving
interventions whenever some life-threatening conditions cannot be
corrected. 30 The second clause of this exception, "ameliorating or
correcting all of the infant's life threatening conditions," 31 cannot
mean any life threatening condition which may shorten a life in the
long term rather than the short term. If parents and doctors were at
liberty to discontinue life-saving measures anytime they could not
improve or correct all life-threatening conditions, the door of
discretion would be opened too widely; it would not only subvert the
Baby Doe Rules but also the Best Interest Standard if families and
doctors could agree not to provide maximal life-saving treatment to
infants who, while they may have a life-threatening condition, could
live well for many years. All humans must die and nothing is
effective in ameliorating or correcting that condition. It would also be
an error to suppose, as this AAP committee did, that the third
exception allows special consideration to relieve suffering because it
states doctors need not provide "inhumane" treatments.32 Although
29. AAP, supra note 26; 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2Xii).
30. AAP, supra note 26; 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(bX2Xii) (2008).
31. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2)(iii) (2008).
32. See AAP, supra note 26.
[Vol. 25:4
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the word "inhumane" is used, the text is as follows: "[t]he provision
of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of
the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be
inhumane. 33 This passage does not permit consideration of the
infant's suffering unless survival is "virtually futile" 34 and this is
generally understood to mean the infant is dying, especially in the
context of an intensive care unit.
35
Although CAPTA's set of Baby Doe Rules went into effect in
1985, they were only recently interpreted by an appellate state court.
In Montalvo v. Borkovec,36 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed
the CAPTA amendments. The case concerned an infant born at
twenty-three week, three day-old gestation who was given maximal
life-saving treatments. Such infants are at the limit of viability and
those who survive often have considerable morbidity. For this reason,
several of the AAP committees and the Nuffield Council in the
United Kingdom recommend discussions with families about
treatment options for such infants, including whether to pursue
comfort care rather than life-prolonging treatments. 37 In Montalvo,
the infant's parents sued, claiming that they were insufficiently
informed about their child's prognosis when they agreed to some of
the life-prolonging interventions.38 The Wisconsin court, however,
disagreed: "[t]he implied choice of withholding treatment, proposed
by the plaintiffs, is exactly what CAPTA prohibits., 39 The court
33. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2)(iii) (2008).
34. Id.
35. For a fuller discussion, see Loretta M. Kopelman, Are the 21-Year-Old Baby Doe Rules
Misunderstood or Mistaken?, 115 PEDIATRICS 797, 799-800 (2005); Loretta M. Kopelman, Rejecting
the Baby Doe Regulations and Defending a "Negative" Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 30 J.
MED. PHIL. 331, 346 (2005).
36. 647 N.W.2d 413,419(2002).
37. AAP, supra note 26, at 150; William Oh, Lillian Blackmon & Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm.
on Fetus & Newborns, The Initiation or Withdrawal of Treatment for High-Risk Newborns, 96
PEDIATRICS 362, 362-63 (1995); Arthur Kohrman, Ellen Wright Clayton & Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,
Comm. on Bioethics, Guidelines on Foregoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 93 PEDIATRICS 532,
532 (1994); Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical Care Decisions in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine:
Ethical Issues 24 (2006), available at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pd7
CCD web version_8 November.pdf.
38. 647 N.W.2d at 415-16.
39. Id. at 419.
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found that unless a child was dying or comatose, parents had no role
in consenting to or refusing maximal treatment and thus no claim
under the state's informed consent statute.40 Consequently, this state
court interpreted the Rules in a way that rejects the sort of
individualized decision-making advocated by such important groups
as the AAP committees4 1 and the United Kingdom's Nuffield
Council.42 This court's understanding exactly reflects the views of
President Reagan 43 and his Surgeon General Koop44 who proposed
both sets of Baby Doe Rules as a way to protect infants' best
interests.
A. Are CAPTA 's Baby Doe Rules in Infants' Best Interests?
CAPTA's Baby Doe Rules were intended to promote infants' best
interest. 45 Yet consider the following case:46
X.D. was diagnosed at birth with holoprosencaphaly and since
then he has reacted only to painful stimuli. Now ten months old,
X.D. has edema and is admitted to the hospital with renal failure
of unknown cause. While he cannot be cured, his kidney disease
can be managed with renal dialysis, which he seems to find very
uncomfortable. Should renal dialysis be required, optional, or
contra-indicated given his underlying condition? Who should
decide what is best for this child?
Holoprosencaphaly is an irreversible condition that results from the
faulty division of the embryonic forebrain and the improper
formation of the double lobes of the cerebral hemisphere. In the most
40. Id.
41. AAP, supra note 26; Kohrman, et al., supra note 37; Oh, et al., supra note 37.
42. The Nuffield Council, supra note 37.
43. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d 413; Reagan, supra note 8.
44. Montalvo, 647 N.W.2d 413; Koop, supra note 9.
45. Reagan, supra note 8; Koop, supra note 9; Murray, supra note 21.
46. This case illustrates the conflict between these two guidance principles and has been discussed
more fully in Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated
Persons ofAllAges, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHiCS 187, 192-93 (2007).
[Vol. 25:4
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severe cases, infants have only single lobe brain structure and they
usually die before birth. All persons with holoprosencaphaly are
mentally retarded but the severity depends upon the degree to which
the lobes separate, ranging from most severe to near normal. X.D. has
a very extreme form: he reacts only to pain, including discomfort
from the treatments keeping him alive.
The Rules would require maximal lifesaving treatments for this
child because he is not dying, can survive with treatments, and is not
in an irreversible coma. Most adults, however, faced with the
prospect of a life holding out only uninterrupted pain-filled
consciousness, prefer palliative care.47 Relief of pain and suffering is
of primary importance to adults most of whom want life and death
choices made by themselves or by their representatives with the
advice of clinicians.48 From this perspective the Rules are inflexible
and allow decision-makers no discretion to make comfort care
primary unless persons are dying or comatose.
In what follows, a central criticism of CAPTA's Baby Doe Rules
will be developed, namely that reasonable persons sometimes decide
that preserving a life violates duties to avoid unnecessary suffering
when too little compensatory benefit exists to justify the pain. In such
cases, higher duties may exist to provide comfort care. Many
committees, councils, and organizations recommend flexibility and
allowing families and doctors to decide what is in the best interests of
incompetent persons or incapacitated adults who have not left
47. Ira Byock, Arthur Caplan, & Lois Snyder, Beyond Symptom Management: Physician Roles and
Responsibility in Palliative Care, in PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE TO END OF LIFE CARE 63-66 (Lois Snyder &
Timothy E. Quill eds., 2001); DEREK DOYLE ET AL., OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PALLIATIVE MEDICINE 1-4
(Oxford Univ. Press 2004); CHRISTINA FAULL, YVONNE H. CARTER & LILIAN DANIELS, HANDBOOK OF
PALLIATIVE CARE 10-11 (Blackwell Publ'g) (2d ed. 2005); JOANNE LYNN, JANICE LYNCH SCHUSTER &
ANDREA KABCENELL, IMPROVING CARE FOR THE END OF LIFE: A SOURCEBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE
MANAGERS AND CLINICIANS 1-5 (Oxford Press 2000); NAT'L HOSPICE ORG. (NHO), STANDARDS OF A
HOSPICE PROGRAM OF CARE (Arlington, Va.: Nat'l Hospice Org. 1990); Peter A. Singer, Douglas K.
Martin, & Merrijoy Kelner, Quality End-of-Life Care: Patients'Perspectives, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
163, 163-68 (1999); Karen E. Steinhauser et al., Factors Considered Important at the End of Life by
Patients, Family, Physicians, and Other Care Providers, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2476,2476-82 (2000);
President's Council on Bioethics, Taking Care: Ethical Caregiving in Our Aging Society, presentation at
The President's Council, Wash., D.C. (2005).
48. See source cited supra note 47.
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advance directives. This includes allowing them to decide when it is
best to withdraw or withhold maximal life-prolonging treatment to
fulfill comfort care goals.49 In contrast, the Rules only allow pain or
suffering to be considered if the treatment would be virtually futile in
terms of survival.
The President's Council on Bioethics,50 in discussing what sort of
care should be provided to elderly persons with dementia lacking
advance directives, recommends flexibility and individualizing
treatment decisions based on an evaluation of their burdens and
benefits in the life of each particular person. If a life is only a burden,
guardians and clinicians should have the option to decide it is in a
patient's best interest to make comfort care primary.
To illustrate these points, the President's Council describes
selection of treatment for a woman in the middle stages of
Alzheimer's disease who needs dialysis three times a week to live.5 1
The woman becomes agitated and confused when taken from her
home. The Council concludes that renal dialysis is optional even
though she will die quickly without it and might live many years with
it. According to the Council, the Best Care or Best Interests Standard
incorporates duties to do no harm (nonmalificence). One of its final
recommendations stresses that maintaining biological life as long as
possible should not always be the highest goal: "[tihe goal of ethical
caregiving in a clinical setting is not to extend the length or postpone
the end of a patient's life as long as is medically possible, but always
to benefit the life the patient still has."52 The President's Council
defends individualized and compassionate care for incapacitated and
incompetent persons with adequate attention to relief of suffering. If
the same principles were applied to the child with holoprosencaphaly,
49. See sources cited supra note 37; President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 47; Steinhauser et
al., supra note 47; Singer et al., supra note 47; Standards of a Hospice Program of Care, supra note 47;
Byock et al., supra note 47; FAULL ET AL., supra note 47; LYNN ET AL., supra note 47; DOYLE ET AL.,
supra note 47.
50. President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 47.
51. Id. at 182.
52. Id. at212.
[Vol. 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 918 2008-2009
918   I   ( l. :  
  
   
t  4   
    
  
t's t ics,50  f 
  ti   
,  
   
  
   
t's   
 ill t t   , '   
  f 
' is s  ho needs dialysis three times a week to live.51 
   
.  il l  t t l     
 
i    
 lifi ce).  
r ti s t  t t i t i i  l  
 ] e  
 
t     ti t'  li   l   i  i ll  ,   
 ,,52 '  
    
   
t    l , 
  t's i ,  r t 
aI., s r  te ; i er t l., s r  t  ; t ards /  s i e gram /Care, ra t  ; 
c  et aI., s r  t  ;   .,  t  ;   .,  t  ;   ., 
ra   
. i t'  il  i t i ,   . 
. [d. . 
[d.   
10
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/7
20091 WHY THE CAPTA'S BABY DOE RULES SHOULD BE REJECTED 919
decision makers should have the option to conclude that his life is
only a burden and that dialysis is not obligatory to keep him alive.
The President's Council explicitly rejects inflexible policies and
acknowledges guardians may be at liberty to select different life and
death options. Their views about the harms of over-treatment and
duties to individualize decisions for incompetent or incapacitated
patients stand in sharp contrast to the inflexibility of the Rules. The
President's Council, therefore, rejects Baby Doe-type rules for
incapacitated adults who have not left advance directives.
Some may argue that special rules are needed for infants less than
one year of age because guardians' choices are less trustworthy than
they are for older children or adults. Yet I know of no data to support
such a sweeping conclusion. Individual cases offer no proof about
what is done generally or what occurs with people of different ages.
Others may argue that the trajectory for elderly persons is known but
not known for infants. But as in the case discussed above, sometimes
the prognosis is as certain as it is for many elderly persons. Still
others argue we must take any chance-even one in a thousand-to
save an infant's life. But adults would rebel if such reasoning applied
to them, so some account must be given as to why we should have a
policy for infants that adults would reject for themselves.53
Recommendations for compassionate and individualized decision-
making are the norm in many policies for all persons and are widely
supported in the pediatric literature including published AAP
policies.54
In what follows, I will argue that infants are better protected by the
older standard for making decisions for incompetent and
incapacitated persons who have not left advance directives, the Best
Interests Standard. Unlike the Rules, which apply only to persons
under one year of age, the Best Interests Standard applies to all
53. These points are developed more filly in Loretta M. Kopelman, Are the 21-Year-Old Baby Doe
Rules Misunderstood or Mistaken?, 115 PEDIATRICS 797, 799-800 (2005); Loretta M. Kopelman,
Rejecting the Baby Doe Regulations and Defending a "Negative" Analysis of the Best Interests
Standard, 30 J. MED. PHILOSOPHY 331, 346 (2005); Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard
for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons ofAllAges, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics 187, 192-93 (2007).
54. See sources cited supra note 37.
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incompetent individuals or persons lacking capacity to make
decisions who have not left directives.
After the Best Interests Standard is clarified and defended in the
next section, it is argued that the Best Interests Standard is a better
infant care decision-making guidance principle than the Rules for
reasons of compassion and fairness. I will argue that the Rules not
only unfairly single out infants for the sort of treatments many or
most adults reject for themselves, but also fail to promote the best
interest of some infants as judged by what informed, competent, and
reasonable adults want for themselves.
55
II. AN ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE OF THE BEST
INTERESTS STANDARD AS A PRACTICAL GUIDANCE PRINCIPLE
The Best Interests Standard is a widely defended standard for
decision-makers to use when guiding practical decisions when
individuals lack decision-making capacity, including infants,
children, and adults lacking advance directives. For example, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland recently stated, "we have long stressed
that the 'best interests of the child' is the overriding concern of this
Court in matters relating to children." 56 Article Three of the United
Nation's Convention on the Rights of the Child provides as follows:
"[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be
a primary consideration. ' '57 But what can it mean to require people to
act in the best interest of all children? In this section I will offer
analysis of the Best Interests Standard that reflects how this guidance
principle is used in practical situations such as medical decision-
making.
55. President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 47; Steinhauser et al., supra note 47; Singer et al.,
supra note 47; Standards of a Hospice Program of Care, supra note 47; Byock et al., supra note 47;
FAULL ET AL., supra note 47; LYNN ET AL., supra note 47; DOYLE ET AL., supra note 47.
56. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 853 (Md. 2001).
57. United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 3 (1989).
[VoL 25:4
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The Best Interests Standard when used as a practical standard has
both objective and subjective features.58 It has "subjective" features
in the sense that it is shaped by the values, views, and perceptions of
decision-makers. Children's guardians should be their primary
decision-makers because they are typically the most knowledgeable
and concerned, bear the consequences of choices, and need to make
personal decisions in a way that may accommodate their particular
values and religious, ethic, social, or philosophical views.
In addition, the Best Interests Standard has "objective" features in
the sense that the guardians' choices must be "good enough." What is
"good enough" should be assessed by sound logical, medical, and
scientific views and by what honors justifiable duties. Parents who
believe that warm baths are more effective to treat their child's
cancer than their child's life-saving and well-tested chemotherapy are
wrong on objective grounds. If parents' ideas about what is best
endanger their child, their preferences should be challenged. 59
Parental beliefs do not substitute for evidence about what options are
acceptable as judged by such sources as science and medicine. Judges
sometimes have to make difficult decisions about what parental
choices are sufficiently good for them to keep custody of their
child.60 Parents who smoke around their children who have severe
asthma may lose custody of them temporarily or permanently for
endangering them.
58. For greater development of these ideas about the Best Interests Standard, see Loretta M.
Kopelman, Analyzing the Best Interests Standard, 10 ASBH ExCH. 10 (2007); Loretta M. Kopelman &
Arthur E. Kopelman, Using a New Analysis of the Best Interests Standard to Address Cultural Disputes:
Whose Data, Which Values?, 28 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICs 373, 373-91 (2007); Loretta M.
Kopelman, Using the Best Interests Standard to Decide Whether to Test Children for Untreatable, Late-
Onset Genetic Diseases, 32 J. MED. & PHIL. 375, 375-94 (2007); Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best
Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of All Ages, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 187,
192-93 (2007); Loretta M. Kopelman, Are the 21-Year-Old Baby Doe Rules Misunderstood or
Mistaken?, 115 PEDIATRICS 797, 799-800 (2005); Loretta M. Kopelman, Rejecting the Baby Doe
Regulations and Defending a "'Negative" Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 30 J. MED.
PHILOSOPHY 331, 346 (2005); Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard as a Threshold, Ideal,
and Standard of Reasonableness, 22 J. MED. & PHIL. 271, 271-89 (1997) [hereinafter Kopelman's Best
Interest Standard Articles].
59. HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 166-70 (West Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 1986).
60. Id.
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The Best Interests Standard was developed to establish that
incompetent or incapacitated individuals have rights independent of
their guardians and are not their property.6' The Best Interests
Standard requires choices for incapacitated or incompetent persons
lacking advance directives that are reasonable or such that competent
and informed people of good will would not find unreasonable.
More precisely, the Best Interests Standard, when used as a
practical guide, should be analyzed in terms of three necessary and
jointly sufficient features to reflect these subjective and objective
features:
62
1) First, decision-makers should use the best available information
to assess the incompetent or incapacitated person's immediate and
long-term interests and set as their prima facie duty that option (or
from among those options) that maximizes the person's overall or
long-term benefits and minimizes burdens.
2) Second, decision-makers should make choices for the
incompetent or incapacitated person that must at least meet a
minimum threshold of acceptable care; what is at least good enough
is usually judged in relation to what reasonable and informed persons
of good will regard to be acceptable were they in the person's
circumstances.
3) Third, decision-makers should make medical choices
compatible with moral and legal duties to incompetent or
incapacitated individuals (those unable to make decisions for
themselves).
By clarifying that the Best Interests Standard requires reasonable
(or not unreasonable) choices, certain differences of opinion about
what is best can be accommodated, given the available options. Some
families may decide to pursue highly experimental treatment to
extend their infant's life briefly while others prefer comfort care at
home.
61. See id. at 170.
62. These ideas are presented or developed in Kopelman's Best Interest Standard Articles, supra
note 58.
[Vol. 25:4
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In addition, this analysis of the practical use of the Best Interests
Standard allows us to distinguish prima facie from actual duties. For
example, suppose it might be best for someone to have a heart and
lung transplant so he can live another year. If this scarce resource
cannot be obtained, however, it cannot be an actual duty.
63
We should aspire to do better than minimally acceptable, however,
so the Best Interests Standard should not be regarded as a "good
enough" standard.
III. RESPONDING TO CRITICS OF THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD
This analysis enables us to respond to critics who argue that the
Best Interests Standard is-self-defeating, individualistic, unknowable,
or vague. 64 It is not self-defeating or incoherent because it does not
require what is best or ideal for everyone; it is not unknowable
because it does not require a crystal ball to look into the future and
see what is best; it is not too individualistic because it does not
require one to ignore all others' interests, needs, resources, or values
and pick out what is best or perfect for one person.
Other critics 65 regard the Best Interests Standard as vague,
subjective, and open to abuse because it fails to give enough direction
to parents or doctors. This criticism, however, fails to take into
account that decision-makers using this standard should be guided by
standards of care and established moral and legal duties to the
incompetent or incapacitated person as well as by a consensus
grounded upon what reasonable and informed competent adults of
good will would want for themselves or others in similar situations.
Previous moral, medical, social, or legal judgments should help guide
decisions by clarifying what constitutes acceptable thresholds of care
and what rights children have. The threshold can be modified when
63. For a fuller discussion, see Kopelman's Best Interest Standard Articles, supra note 58.
64. For a detailed response to these criticisms and those holding them, see Kopelman's Best Interest
Standard Articles, supra note 58.
65. See Reagan, supra note 8; Koop supra note 9; for a detailed response to these criticisms and
those holding them see Kopelman's Best Interest Standard Articles, supra note 58.
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new information or resources become available. For example, some
acceptable medical interventions in the past would be considered
abusive or neglectful today.
A related criticism is that the Best Interests Standard is vague and
useless because it fails to offer an unambiguous threshold about
what is acceptable. On this view, if a clear standard can be articulated
it should be stated; if it cannot be articulated, the Best Interest
Standard should be abandoned.66 The insight that should be taken
from this criticism is not that this standard should be abandoned, but
that this highly abstract guidance principle needs to be specified and
clarified by reasonable, competent and informed people of good will
in particular circumstances. In a specific situation-such as whether
surgery for an infant's heart defect is in his best interests-a
considerable body of existing information and recommendations by
experts should inform decisions about how to balance benefits and
burdens or draw upon standards of care in deciding the best option
for the baby. The Best Interests Standard will be hard to use when
there is no consensus about what options are unreasonable. Yet
disputes about how to interpret abstract principles or how to decide
difficult or borderline cases arise in the use of many or most
standards and so should not be seen as a unique problem for the Best
Interests Standard. Our disagreement may be based upon different
understandings of one's duties, upon insufficient data, misunder-
standings, miscommunications, or value conflicts.
This analysis of the Best Interests Standard is intended to be
compatible with legal definitions of it in terms of a reasonable person
standard. The President's Council, for example, distinguishes the Best
Interests Standard from the moral standard of providing the "best
care," writing:
Best interest: a legal standard of caregiving for incompetent
patients, defined by the courts in terms of what a "reasonable
66. Thomas J. Balch, Are There Checks and Balances on Terminating the Lives of Children with
Disabilities? Should There Be?, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 959 (2009).
[Vol. 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 924 2008-2009
924  I IT   L  
   
l    
  
  
s   
. l t  
   st 
6   
  
t t t i  i l    l     
  l ,   
i  rti l r ir t . I   i i  it ti -such   
 '  terests-a 
l  ti  ti s  
  
 
  
t  i    t t   .  
i t       
  
   
t t  t .    
i s  '  t 
i ti s,  
i  l i   t  t    
      
'  il, l ,  
t       t 
,"  
    
 l  
1  s inating  l ren  
i ilities? l   ,  . . . . .  . 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/7
20091 WHY THE CAPTA'S BABY DOE RULES SHOULD BE REJECTED 925
person" would decide in the same situation. A consideration of
best interests generally attempts to weigh the burdens and
benefits of treatment to the patient in his present condition, when
no clear preferences of the patient can be determined.67
The analysis offered herein is not intended to be limited to a legal
standard. It is hoped that its various meanings can be united under
one umbrella to strengthen its role in providing moral, legal, medical,
social, or other guidance.
68
IV. WHY THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD IS
SUPERIOR TO THE BABY DOE RULES
The three exceptions found in the Rules were intended to severely
restrict the quality of life choices that parents and doctors could
make, limiting them to decisions about whether or not to maintain the
life of comatose or dying infants. 69  Though the Reagan
Administration and right-to-life groups strongly supported the
Rules,7 ° two reasons will be given for regarding the Best Interests
Standard as the better guidance principle and for rejecting the Rules.
First, the Rules single out one group, infants under the age of one,
for a set of rules that most adults would not tolerate for themselves;
adults faced with a choice between prolonging a life and preventing
intractable pain and suffering sometimes believe that there are worse
things than dying.71 This attitude is reflected in the first priority of
palliative care as the relief of pain and suffering. 72 Most adults do not
want the sort of inflexible regulations found in the Rules. For
example, wide legal, moral, and social support exists to withdraw
some medication, nutrition, and hydration or give sufficient pain
67. See President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 47, at 231.
68. See Kopelman's Best Interest Standard Articles, supra note 58.
69. See Reagan, supra note 8; Koop, supra note 9.
70. See Murray, supra note 21.
71. See Steinhauser et al., supra note 47; Singer et al., supra note 47; Byock et al., supra note 47.
72. See NHO, supra note 47; Byock et al., supra note 47.
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medication to fulfill palliative goals. 73 If we agree that it is wrong to
do to others what we would not want for ourselves and that we would
not want a Baby Doe policy for ourselves, then we should not adopt
such a policy for infants under one year of age.
In contrast, the Best Interests Standard applies to persons of all
ages lacking decision-making capacity or competency who have not
left advance directives, and it permits the sort of compassionate and
individualized decision-making widely recommended, including at
the end of life.74 The President's Council on Bioethics sums this up in
one of its final recommendations: "[tihe clearest ethical grounds for
foregoing life-sustaining treatments are an obligation to avoid
inflicting treatments that are unduly burdensome to the patient being
treated and an obligation to avoid treatments that are not at all (or not
any longer) efficacious in attaining their desired result., 75
Second, for reasons of compassion as well as fairness, infants
should have the same opportunities for comfort care as adults want
for themselves. When adults cannot make decisions for themselves,
they generally want their guardians or families and doctors deciding
what choices are best given the circumstances. Most adults do not
want to prolong minimally or permanently unconscious life.76
The President's Council recommends decision-makers should
make reasonable and prudent choices given the particular
circumstances because simple rules and blanket interpretations will
not cut finely enough for such individualized and compassionate
choices: "[t]hese kinds of questions-and more broadly, the
relationship between treatment and well-being for persons with
dementia-can be considered only in concrete cases, with due regard
for both the moral principles that should guide all care giving
73. See NHO, supra note 47; Byock et al., supra note 47. Surveys of adults show adequate pain
control is a top concern in end-of-life care. See Steinhauser et al., supra note 47; Singer et al., supra note
47.
74. See NHO, supra note 47; Byock et al., supra note 47; Steinhauser et al., supra note 47; Singer et
al., supra note 47.
75. See President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 47, at 213.
76. See NHO, supra note 47; Byock et al., supra note 47.
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decisions and the irreducible particularity of every clinical
situation.
' 77
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize, CAPTA's Baby Doe Rules and the Best Interests
Standard can offer incompatible guidance for infants who are not
dying or comatose but live with intractable pain sometimes from the
technologies keeping them alive. In such cases, life comfort care may
be a higher duty. The Rules are inconsistent with the broad medical,
legal, moral, and social support to withdraw some medication,
nutrition and hydration or give sufficient pain medication to fulfill
palliative goals.
78
An analysis of the Best Interests Standard is given to clarify its
use as a practical guidance standard and to answer critics. When used
as a practical guidance principle, it contains both objective and
subjective features, and should be analyzed in terms of three
necessary and jointly sufficient features: 1) First, decision-makers
should use the best available information to assess the incompetent or
incapacitated person's immediate and long-term interests and set as
their prima facie duty that option (or from among those options) that
maximizes the person's overall or long- term benefits and minimizes
burdens. 2) Second, decision-makers should make choices for the
incompetent or incapacitated person that must at least meet a
minimum threshold of acceptable care; what is at least good enough
is usually judged in relation to what reasonable and informed persons
of good will regard to be acceptable were they in the person's
circumstances. 3) Third, decision-makers should make medical
choices compatible with moral and legal duties to incompetent or
incapacitated individuals (those unable to make decisions for
themselves).79 Properly understood, the Best Interests Standard does
77. See President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 47, at 177.
78. See NHO, supra note 47; Byock, et al., supra note 47.
79. This analysis was discussed in more detail in Kopelman's Best Interest Standard Articles, supra
note 58.
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not, as critics charge, require people to do what is best or ideal for the
incompetent individual, ignoring all other interests, resources or
perspectives, nor is it incoherent, self-defeating, vague or open to
abuse.
The Best Interests Standard is superior to CAPTA's Baby Doe
Rules because, first, it is fairer since it offers the same guidance for
all incompetent and incapacitated individuals who have not left
advance directives. Second, it is more compassionate as judged by
the sort of individualized and compassionate decision-making that
adults want for themselves, 80 and it is also better as judged by
recommendations made by prestigious pediatric groups for the care
of imperiled infants that allow for pain and suffering.81 For reasons of
fairness and compassion, then, parents or guardians of infants should
have options similar to those making decisions for their incapacitated
or incompetent adult relatives lacking advance directives. Decision-
makers' choices using the Best Interests Standard should be
reasonable (or not unreasonable) and made within acceptable limits
and with the agreement of clinicians. Their options should be
understood in terms of established moral and legal duties to the
incompetent individual and a consensus about what choices are
unacceptable as judged by informed and reasonable people of good
will.
80. See President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 47; Singer, et al, supra note 47; Steinhauser, et
al., supra note 47; NHO, supra note 47; J. Lantos, Seeking Justice for Priscilla, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHics 485,485-92 (1996).
81. See sources cited supra note 37.
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TABLE 1: CRITICISMS OF CAPTA's BABY DOE RULES FROM 494
MEMBERS OF THE PERINATAL SECTION OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF PEDIATRICS (49% RESPONSE RATE) AND FROM A RANDOM
SAMPLING OF 730 AAP PEDIATRICIANS WHO WERE NOT
NEONATOLOGISTS (25% RESPONSE RATE) SURVEYED IN 1986
(SEE KOPELMAN ET AL., SUPRA NOTE 10 (1988) AND (1992))
The BDR-II will result in improved care for all infants
% Agree % Uncertain % Disagree
Neonatologist 5 14 81
Other pediatricians 6 16 78
The BDR-II were needed to protect the rights of handicapped infants
Neonatologist 14 10 76
Other pediatricians 20 12 67
The BDR-II will not affect parental rights to consent to or refuse
treatment based upon what is in the infant's best interest
Neonatologist 19 15 66
Other pediatricians 19 17 65
The BDR II allows adequate consideration of suffering
Neonatologist 29 11 60
Other pediatricians 30 14 56
Most critically ill infants are over treated when the chances for their
survival are very poor
Neonatologist 56 13 31
Other pediatricians 62 18 19
If the federal government requires life-saving treatment of severely
handicapped infants, then it should guarantee payment for that
treatment
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Neonatologist 82 6 12
Other pediatricians 76 8 16
If the federal government requires life-saving treatment of severely
handicapped infants, then it should guarantee payment for their
rehabilitative care
Neonatologist 82 6 12
Other pediatricians 75 9 16
The BDR-II have exacerbated the shortage of NICU beds
Neonatologist 17 32 51
Other pediatricians 24 50 25
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